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I. Forward 
Of all my college classes, postmodern black literature was the one with which I 
identified and connected the nl0St. This might at first seem a little odd, as I am white 
man. After all, how much can I really know of the disparate and tragic treatment that 
African-Americans have suffered in this country? What is it to be black and American? 
What experiences could I have had that could tum my sympathy into true empathy? 
Honestly, I have come to understand that I will never be able to fully comprehend the 
answers to the previous questions. I did, however, try to come as close to understanding 
these issues as I could. Literature was my link. I was able to see myself in Nella 
Larson's Passing, a book about light skinned blacks "passing" as Italians or even whites 
in order to live life free of the societal shackles of the 1920's. Having lived most of my 
life "passing" for something that I am not, I felt a connection with the novel. Yet I'm not 
sure if that nly connection was a direct identification. No, it was more of an indirect 
relation. 
Another work that I could indirectly relate to was Patricia J. Williams' book, the 
Alchemy of Race and Rights. She opens the first chapter by saying, "Since subject 
position is everything in my analysis of the law, you deserve to know it is a very bad 
morning" (1). This sentence, when taken with the fact that she is a black, female lawyer 
reviewing an 1835 case about redhibitory vices concerning a slave, is quite revealing. In 
the case a slave named Kate is found to be worthless because she is crazy; thus, the buyer 
can demand reimbursement for this worthless "property." In essence Ms. Williams' 
"subject position" statement is about identifications, and in her review of the 19!h.century 
case, an inversion of sorts takes place. She identifies not with the judge rendering the 
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decision but rather with the slave. Indeed much of her legal thinking is in constant flux 
between object and subject positions. 
In this project, I too am in constant flux between my object and subject positions. 
While trying to examine whether gays and lesbians are deserving of a protected class 
status, I often project myself into the cases and professional analyses. Since I am a gay 
man, this is a natural response. Thus, maintaining cold academic objectivity will not be 
my solitary goal in this paper. Make no mistake; such a deviation from a dry legalistic 
examination will not jeopardize the integrity of this project. Rather, it will infuse it in a 
manner that should add to its value. Object and subject shall be one. 
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II. Introduction 
Broadly speaking, this work is about gay rights. In this general framework of gay 
rights and liberties, I will focus specifically on arguing that homosexuals should be 
viewed by the American jUdiciary as a suspect class. This goal will be achieved by 
examining several factors, that when seen with their aggregate effect, will show that 
elevating gays and lesbians to this class is just, reasonable, and most of all, logical. This 
analysis will proceed by first defining the terms of the discussion. Next, the case of 
Bowers v. Hardwick will be examined thoroughly, as it is key to an examination of 
homosexual's suspectness--even thought the opinion never mentions it! Then, keeping in 
mind the Hardwick case, the undeniable applicability of sodomy laws as a barrier to 
establish homosexuals as a suspect class will be shown. After that, the Court's use of a 
rational basis test, with its various facets, will be examined. Then, I will move into the 
discussion of suspect classification by defining what constitutes this designation and 
examining each qualification in terms of homosexuality. I will then continue to show the 
possible effects that elevating gays and lesbians to this status would have on society. 
Finally, I will sum up the work, bringing all the previously nlentioned aspects together. 
A work such as this could possibly take hundreds of pages, yet this one in 
particular will not. In advocating a suspect classification for gay Americans, I will 
proceed by following the foregoing structural outline. Yet it is key that you, as the 
reader, understand the interplay of sodomy laws, status versus conduct arguments, and 
suspect classification. The main thrust of this project is seen in the undercurrent that 
sodomy laws have upon the juridical analysis of gay rights and liberties issues. It is 
equally important that by the time you reach the conclusion of this paper, you understand 
Beach 6 
that while status versus conduct arguments seem to help gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, 
they are an implicit barrier to obtaining civil privileges. Indeed, the theoretical 
underpinnings of theses three subjects have an interconnectedness that must not go 
unnoticed. For when sodomy prohibitions are viewed in tandem with status/conduct 
distinctions and are then applied to suspect classification, the result is disastrous for 
homosexuals. As you will soon see ... 
III. Terms and Definitions 
First of all, gay rights have to been seen for what they actually are and not what 
their opponents would assert. Thus, it is essential to this argument to understand what 
gay rights are not; they are not special rights. Gay rights do not seek to obtain rights that 
other Americans do not posses. Rather, they seek to secure the rights that other 
Americans already have and assert on a daily basis. In short, gay rights seek to win the 
"same personal, social, economic, political, and legal rights guaranteed to and taken for 
granted by nearly all nongay Americans" (Newton 6). Achieving the aforementioned 
goals will hopefully bring gays and lesbians to plane where they can live without fear that 
their sexual orientation will be a "strike" against them in American society. 
In addition, you will not find the term "sexual preference" in this analysis. In 
short, it is offensive, and an affront to the situation of gay Americans. It inherently 
implies a choice in the direction of one's sexual attraction. While a person can choose to 
physically engage in whatever type of sexual activity he/she desires, the direction of one's 
sexual attraction cannot be altered. "It [sexual orientation] can be stifled, sublimated, 
beaten down, condemned, and hated, but it cannot be changed" (White 72). I choose to 
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be gay no more than any other person can choose to be attracted to members of the 
opposite sex. While I can master my reactions to my attraction, the particular 
characteristics that fit my sensual grid are not objects of my own choice or preference. 
So, sexual orientation will be the wording that embodies the general term encompassing 
its various subsets, which include, but are not limited to: heterosexuality, homosexuality, 
and bisexuality. 
Asking exactly what constitutes the term homosexual is a rather strait-forward 
question, but the answer is profoundly complex. It is necessary, however, to have a 
working definition of this particular orientation. Contrary to popular belief, identification 
as a gay man or a lesbian woman does not have to involve any kind of sexual act, 
however closely connected status and conduct might be. Indeed, many gays and lesbians 
understand that they are different, that they are homosexual, at an early age-long before 
any kind of san1e-sex experience actually takes place. Yet as one progresses with 
experience and age, status and conduct almost invariably fuse. The distinction between 
the two ceases to exist, as they become almost indivisible. 
But with regards to establishing if someone is or is not gay, the most basic way to 
make a determination is to discover the person's sexual identification. If a person 
identifies him/herself as homosexual, then establishing status in order to claim civil rights 
entitlements is somewhat easier. Obviously, there is always the possibility that a person 
that is not same-sex oriented could claim homosexual status in order to claim some kind 
of liberty for whatever purpose. A Court could dispose of this fairly quickly, I think, by 
way of witnesses that know the person, sworn affidavits, and quite possibly, 
psychological evaluations. However by pursuing this form of status establishment, some 
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gays and lesbians could be hurt by being in the closet; thus, they would have no witnesses 
to testify to their sexual orientation. A psychological exam would have to suffice in this 
case. But like any other claim of status, that of homosexuality would have to be proven. 
As I said, defining the tern1 "homosexual" is an intricate and delicate matter. For 
instance, Robert Wintemute of London's King College states in his book that there are 
essentially four ways to look at the term sexual orientation. When a person says that 
he/she is gay-bisexual or heterosexual for that matter-it could refer to: 
"(a) the direction of the person's attraction, (b) the direction of their conduct (taken as a whole), (c) 
the direction of a specific instance of their conduct, or (d) their 'identity' (i.e. whether they 
consider that the direction of their emotional-sexual attraction or conduct serves in part to define 
them both as a unique individual as a part of a group or community of similar individuals)" 
(Wintemute 8). 
Looking at homosexuality in these parameters, one can easily see that homosexuality can 
be quite a convoluted matter, as there is no consistency to the four senses of sexuality 
outlined above. For example, "a married man who has just engaged in sexual activity 
with another man, does so frequently, and is primarily attracted to men, but considers 
himself heterosexual and frequently engages in sexual activity with his wife" (8) might 
logically be gay, bisexual, and heterosexual by the distinctions offered by Wintemute. 
But, I would assert that rather than seeing where our esteemed friend Robert places this 
poor soul, we should instead look to where this man placed himself and where those who 
can affect his life (i.e. a landlord, employer, etc.) would place him. 
I would assert that self-identification as a homosexual is indeed important to 
status establishment. Yet, a self-identification of this sort is usually not known by a 
potential employer in an interview situation. Instead, a perception of this person's sexual 
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orientation is used, whether it is consistent with the person's self-identified orientation or 
not. While Mr. Wintemute does little more than confuse our efforts to establish a 
working definition of a homosexual, looking to definitions of what legally constitutes an 
African-American provides some insight. 
"Colored" is defined in a myriad of contradictory and obtuse ways. While an 
African-American can be one who posses "a distinct and visible admixture of negro 
blood" (7 A: 294), the term can also apply to persons having only "one-sixteenth negro 
blood" (293), whether they appear to be of African descent or not. While obviously 
fiction, Mark Twain's novel Puddinhead Wilson illustrates the two ends of this 
discriminatory spectrum perfectly, as does Nella Larson's Passing in that they both have 
characters that are by definition black, but by all accounts appear white. When reading 
through the various definitions that were used to legally identify African-Americans, it is 
clear that they had been drawn with such wide variability in order to discriminate as the 
situation saw fit. They were used in segregation laws, separate and unequal schools 
mandates, interracial marriages, and laws to invalidate African American jurors, because 
they were ipso facto "unqualified electors" (294). The discriminatory means was used to 
justify the discriminatory ends. 
However, the most useful contribution of these definitions to our effort is one that 
states that a person's color is not only compromised of individual characteristics but is 
also one of status, one of perception. The Words and Phrases legal reference book cites 
the case of White v. Tax Collector of Kershaw District: 
"The question whether a person is colored a person, in cases involving the status of colored 
persons, partakes more of a political than of a legal character, and belongs almost entirely to the 
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jury, and should be detennined, not solely by the admixture of negro blood, but by reputation, by 
reception in society, and by the exercise of privileges of a white man (294)." 
This statement is a powerful assertion and will certainly help to define homosexuality. 
For not only the immutable racial identity of a person is basis for a status argument but 
also the societal perception of that person. This can, in part, apply to establishing 
homosexuality a definable status. For if someone is perceived to be gay or lesbian, then 
this can be a powerful tool wielded by a discriminatory agenda. 
With the previous assertions in mind, homosexuals will be defined in this paper as 
persons who identify themselves as gay or lesbian, and as people who are perceived as 
gay or lesbian. This is a rather simple definition given the complexity of the above 
examinations. In addition, this paper will focus primarily on honl0sexuality, seeing that 
it is what concerns me the most, but make no mistake that the arguments presented on 
behalf of gays certainly can include bisexual people. 
Finally it is necessary to understand that this work will not immediately jump into 
the discussion of the whether or not homosexuals should be incorporated into the list of 
classes that receive the strict scrutiny analysis. Instead, I will start with an extended 
analysis of the decision in the case of Bowers v. Hardwick. The question posed in this 
case asks: does a person have a fundamental constitutional right to engage in private, 
consensual, homosexual sodomy? In the eyes of many judges, gays and lesbians are 
defined by their sexual acts, yet this issue isn't touched upon in the case. These assertions 
are correct only to a point, for it is possible to be gay and not have sex, just as it is 
possible to be heterosexual and not have sex. However, this is a rarity that defies the real 
workings of human relations-people have sex. Thus, if sodomy laws can be examined 
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extensively as inherent barriers to gay rights, then the argument for suspect classification 
flows more easily. 
IV. Bowers v. Hardwick: A. Logic of the Opinion 
The Supreme Court finds in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1989), that the 
Georgia statute which proscribed sodomy was in fact constitutional. The logic which 
supported this decision is buttressed by five key points which are as follows: (a) the 
federal Constitution does not confer a fundamental fight upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy (478 U.S. at 190); (b) such behavior is not "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'" (478 U.S. at 195); (c) the 
Court should be wary of "[expanding] the reach of the Due Process Clause" (478 U.S. at 
194) for fear ofillegitimatizing itself [referencing the Court]; (d) just because the act took 
place in the privacy of the home "does not affect the result" (478 U.S. at 195); (e) and 
that it is inadequate to invalidate anti-sodomy laws on the basis that "majority belief that 
sodomy is immoral" (478 U.S. at 196). 
This analysis shall proceed by examining logic of each of the aforementioned key 
issues using a two-tiered method of inspection. The first shall trace the logic by which 
the majority reasons, and the second shall examine whether that logic by way of the 
dissents. 
Key issue (a), which declares homosexual sodomy as an act which can be 
proscribed by the states, is found to be so by the majority because it runs afoul to the 
"right of privacy" string of cases. Said cases, they reason, have common characteristics 
which include "fanlily, nlarriage, [and] procreation" (478 U.S. at 191) that warrant 
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judicial protection. These characteristics are not applicable to homosexual activity; thus, 
sodomy can be proscribed by the state. However, the second tier of examination finds an 
unsettling flaw in this argument. 
Justice Blackmun retorts that homosexuality is merely a fayade for the main thrust 
of the case, which is "namely 'the right to be left alone'" (478 U.S. at 199). First of all, he 
finds that the Court has misconstrued the issue. For the persistent targeting of 
homosexual sodomy as opposed to heterosexual sodomy, or rather sodomy in general, is 
unwarranted. This is because the Georgia statute was designed to "reach heterosexual as 
well as hon10sexual activities" (478 U.S. at 200); thus, the issue at hand has nothing to do 
with the sexual orientation of the respondent. Perhaps the focus of the Supreme Court on 
only homosexuals raises questions regarding the Equal Protection Clause. Furthermore 
Blackmun finds that while the line of "right to privacy" cases do pertain to the matters 
stated above, they do not necessarily lend themselves to preclude homosexual sodon1Y. 
He states that the reasoning behind protecting the privacy issues raised in the other cases 
was that "we protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct material 
way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an 
individual's life" (478 U.S. at 204). Thus, he shows that using the "right to privacy" 
string of cases as an argument for the proscription of sodomy is open to legal attack. 
Key issue (b), which stated that homosexual sodomy does not lend itself to 
heightened judicial protection because it is not part of the Nation's tradition of 
fundamental liberties, is supported with myriad examples by the majority which date 
back all the way to the Roman Empire up until the present day. They illustrate that with 
such a plethora of citations which condemn homosexual sodomy, that any attempt to 
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define it as a fundamental right are "at best, facetious" (478 U.S. at 194). Once again, the 
second tier of examination renders the above argument susceptible to attack. Justice 
Stevens cites many cases and examples that support his argument that "the fact that the 
governing majority on a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is 
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice" (478 U.S. at 216). 
Justice Blackmun also tears holes in the majority's logic by quoting Justice Holmes in the 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) case, "[i]t is revolting to have no better 
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still 
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and 
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Thus, one can clearly see that 
the logic employed by the Court in key issue (b) is open to debate. 
The next key issue, (c), which resists expanding the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for fear of overstepping its constitutional authority, is supported 
with the battle between the Judiciary and Executive branches in the 1930's and the belief 
that the "Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with 
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or 
design of the Constitution" (478 U.S. at 194). Yet again the second tier of analysis poses 
very serious questions in regards to the aforementioned assertion. Blackmun claims that 
the Court has erred in key issue (c) not only because of the Court's unwillingness to 
expand the protection offered by the Due Process Clause but also by the fact that it 
refused to examine the case with the full weight afforded by the Constitution. This 
simply means that it refused to examine the possible roles that the Eighth, Ninth, or 
Fourteenth Amendments could play in the case. Blacknlun states that it is a "well-settled 
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principle of law that" (478 U.S. at 201) even if certain arguments are not advanced by a 
party involved, it is the duty of the court to use any "possible theory [to grant relief]" 
(478 U.S. at 201). Moreover, the dissenters assert that the real issue at stake, that of 
privacy, is quite fundanlental. Thus, the Due Process Clause is indeed enconlpassing to 
the dissenters, despite the claim of the majority. 
The fourth key issue, (d), which states that the ruling in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 
U.S. 557 (1969), isn't applicable to the case at hand, is advanced because the majority 
feels that Stanley was a First Amendment issue. The Court illustrates that even in Stanley 
"otherwise illegal conduct is not always inlmunized whenever it occurs in the honle" (478 
U.S. at 195). They continue to show that "if respondent's submission is limited to the 
voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult, to limit the 
claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, 
incest, and other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the home. We are 
unwilling to start down that road" (478 U.S. 195-196). In sum, the Court feels that the 
protection afforded in the Stanley case is wholly and undeniably inapplicable to 
Hardwick. 
However the use of the second tier of analysis employs the arguments of the 
dissenters. Namely, Blackmun asserts that the ruling in Stanley "rested as much on the 
Court's understanding of the Fourth Amendment as it did on the First" (478 U.S. at 207). 
He quotes passages from Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.195 (1973) and says, 
"The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses, 'expressly guaranteed by the 
Fourth Anlendment, is perhaps the most 'textual' of the various constitutional provisions 
that inform our understanding of the right to privacy, and thus I cannot agree with the 
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Court's statement that '[t]he right pressed upon us here has no ... support in the text of 
the Constitution" (478 U.S. at 208). Again the soundness of the majority's logic can be 
called into question. 
Finally, key issue (e), which finds the majority's belief that an act is immoral is 
not sufficient for invalidating a law that proscribes it, is based on the fact that many laws 
of this Nation find their origins on morals. The Court says succinctly, "The law .. .is 
constantly based in notions of morality" (478 U.S. at 196). Thus, commonly held morals 
and laws that relate to thenl are not mutually exclusive. In contrast, the dissenters add 
that that "the fact that the acts described in 16-6-2 'for hundreds of years, if not 
thousands, have been uniformly condemned as immoral' is [not] a sufficient reason to 
permit a State to ban them today." (478 U.S. at 210). Moreover, Blackmun says that 
"religious groups [that] condemn the behavior at issue gives the State no license to 
impose their judgments on the entire citizenry" (478 U.S. at 212). So the issue of morals 
is one that is not one of clear-cut legal determination. 
In short, all five of the key issues raised by the majority in this case can be subject 
to criticism and attack. It is at best an argument that is thinly wrapped in constitutionality 
and perhaps will be reversed in time, as were others that were supported by a narrow 
majority and weak logic. 
B. Use of Special Tests 
The use of special tests in this case gives rise to interesting and perhaps enigmatic 
questions. One such question is that of the level of scrutiny, the general theme of this 
project. Usually when the rights of a group, especially one that is pervasively and 
systematically discriminated against, are in question, the Court will use a heightened 
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level of scrutiny (either strict scrutiny or heightened scrutiny) to make the government 
justify its proscription. At first glance, homosexuals would appear to be a part of one 
such group, yet the Court employs the lowest level of scrutiny in this case, that of a 
"rational basis test." This test asserts that discrimination must be rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest. 
One of the legitimate state interests of the purported by Georgia is that of "the 
general public health and welfare" (Brief for the Petitioner). Yet the core of the 
Petitioner's defense is the exercise of the "'right of the Nation and of the States to 
maintain a decent society,'" (Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S., at 59-60) a state 
police power argument, quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, (378 U.S. 184, 199 [1964], Warren, 
C. J., dissenting). Finally, a state interest is articulated in support of the statute 16-6-2 
because it "can be justified as a 'morally neutral' exercise of Georgia's power to "'protect 
the public environment'" (478 U.S. at 211). This seems to me to be entirely untenable 
especially with regards to the homosexual focus of the Court. Although the dissenters 
attack these assertions, they are the arguments of the petitioner which were affirmed. 
Finally, the other process applied to this case was that of a principle first coined 
by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1932). This principle "was 
designed to incorporate some provisions of the Bill of Rights [termed fundamental rights] 
into the Fourteenth Amendment" (Khan 969). But, as mentioned earlier in this work, the 
Court determined that homosexual sodomy was not a protected right, and certainly not a 
fundamental one. Thus, incorporation was seen as a non-issue. 
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c. Use of Precedent 
The use of precedent was strong in parts of this case, yet at times it was 
ridiculously far reaching. The majority affirms the precedent that was set in the cases of 
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (ED Va. 
1975) and Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579 (1984), both of which were staggering 
blows to homosexual rights and liberties. But as stated previously, the Court cited 
evidence all the way back to the Roman Empire up to the present day. While it is true 
that the American judiciary is based on English Common Law and many Judeo-Christian 
values, when said models contain provisions that are a mere habit of custom rather than 
practical use, they ought to be reexamined in terms of functionality and utility. Also, 
when the use of precedent is seriously examined in terms of comparison and rebuttal by 
that of the dissenters, it is rendered somewhat weak and unconvincing. 
For instance, the string of "right to privacy cases" which include: Carey v. 
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678,685 (1977); Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex reI. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.479 (1965); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 479 (1972); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); are 
rendered somewhat invalid with Blackmun's assertion that they have a common thread 
which articulates that the privacy issue originates from protected rights stemming from 
the "'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole'" 
(478 U.S. at 204). 
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Moreover, the majority opinion with the concurrences, when compared with the 
dissents, falls short in regards to quality and quantity of its use of precedent. While the 
quantity of the citations in the dissents was great, it does not necessarily, as with 
anything, confer a definite assurance of quality. In this matter, however, the quality and 
quantity of the citations are in concordance. As previously, stated the dissents go strait to 
the heart of the "right to privacy" cases, an issue in which the majority is remiss. 
Furthermore, it quotes several cases that serve to bolster the supposition that just because 
a majority does not value a freedom, it is no less of a freedom. One such case is that of 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,223-224 (1972), in which it was held that one cannot 
make the assumption that a majority is necessarily right and that minority is necessarily 
wrong based on their nUITlbers. 
Summarily, the quality and quantity of citations and use of precedent by the 
dissenters is much more convincing than the shallowly interpreted cases and antiquated 
codes of dead Roman Emperors and haughty English Kings used by the majority. 
D. Creation of new tests, rules, and precedents 
This section should prove to be rather short, due to the fact no new tests or rules 
were created. But a new precedent was in fact set. And the ruling in this case is the 
benchmark for several precedents. First of all, the right to engage in homosexual sodomy 
is not protected by the Constitution. Second, "[states] may criminalize homosexual 
sodomy, even if it is practiced among consenting adults in the privacy of a home" (Khan 
957). And finally the decision says, which bleeds together with the first point, that "the 
right of privacy pronounced in Prior Court cases does not extend to homosexual sodomy 
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(958). These clarifications on the legality of anti-sodomy laws are a precedent, however 
unfortunate it may be, to legally deprive homosexuals of protection under the law for 
such activity. Yet, by not addressing key issues, like that of equal protection, lower 
courts can fashion various arguments from the decision. It leaves an open, constitutional 
interpretive door of sorts. 
E. Professional Opinions 
The professional legal opinions of experts examined in this work each severely 
criticize the Court for weak if not faulty logic. One point on which each critique agrees is 
the distortion of the Georgia Statute by the Court, which is also pointed out by Justices 
Stevens and Blackmun. Vlahos asserts in her article that "although the prohibitions of the 
statute undoubtedly affect homosexuals to a greater extent than heterosexuals, the 
statute's terms do not single out homosexuals. However, the majority does. This raises 
equal protection concerns about selective enforcement and seriously undercuts the force 
of the majority's argument" (191). In focusing so pointedly on homosexuals, many see 
the majority opinion as "an expression of politically motivated homophobia" (Vlahos 
192). Thus, the supposedly blind, unbiased nature of justice may have been tainted, the 
more political nature of the Court is seen instead. Vlahos believes in sum that the Court's 
decision was somewhat disappointing regardless of the side favored because "many 
issues were left unresolved, and neither the majority nor the dissent provided particularly 
convincing supporting arguments" (194). So the case is seen not to be grounded in the 
most firm and sound logic. 
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Also the Court is attacked for its blind reliance on antiquated moral teachings as a 
valid reason to uphold anti-sodomy laws. Yet, the "long history of restrictions on 
homosexuals, like the long history of state-sanctioned racial discrimination before it, 
illustrates the need for judicial intervention" (Cohen 217), a role the Court is quite 
unwilling to assume. Furthermore the made two value choices it adopted a traditional 
view of the family which "excludes a homosexual relationship" (218) and closely related 
that a family is strictly "heterosexual. . .it need not have done so" (218). This view of the 
Court is not wholly necessary because a finding in favor of homosexual sodomy "would 
have been consistent with the decisional focus of the previous privacy cases" (218). 
Thus, the holding of the Court meets severe approbation from this critic. 
Lastly, a more scathing critic, Kahn, finds three major problems with the ruling: 
(1) "that the nlajority ignored the issue [that] the case presented (Khan 958), (2) that the 
decision reached is "analytically indefensible" (958), and (3) "that the reasons advanced 
by the court are based on "legally unacceptable rhetoric and discarded historical 
morality" (958). The first argument is one advanced already in this work; it has to do 
with the focus of the Court on only homosexuals, which is at odds with the seeping 
language of the statute. In short, the "classifications are unnecessary precisely because 
the statute focuses upon the act of sodomy, not upon the social identity of sodomites" 
(959), an assertion that is mirrored in this work as well. The unsound reasoning 
argument is offered because of the Court's interpretation of the privacy line of cases. 
Kahn echoes Blackmun's dissent when he says, "the Court's focus upon the specific rights 
rather than privacy and thus obscures the reason for which these rights are protected. For 
if the string of privacy is broken, these distinct rights will scatter" (962). 
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Finally, Khan asserts that the court used legally unacceptable means to arrive at it 
decision. Here he makes a distinction between thin and thick analysis. He feels that 
"when the issue presented involves a claimed fundamental liberty, thin analysis can only 
be used when the court is certain that thick analysis would also yield a similar result 
(975). Here he invokes the Ashwander Rules, more specifically the narrowness doctrine, 
which states that the Court should avoid (when possible) sweeping pronouncements of 
constitutionality. Khan sees this case as an abuse of the Court's self-imposed restrictions 
relating to judicial review. However, he notes that "it is highly probable that the statute 
might have been stuck down, if the Court had applied the full weight of the constitution 
(976). So the ruling in this case seems to be heavily criticized by most critics and every 
expert in this work on grounds of weak logic. 
F. Ruling as a Coherent Guide for the Lower Courts 
Although it was stated above that the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick helped to 
clear up some of the discrepancies in the Circuit Courts, it creates an array of other 
problems for the lower courts. While the Court is "abundantly clear that homosexual 
sodomy is not a protected right ... the equal protection status of homosexuals is unclear" 
(Rich 788). This arises from two issues: first is the fact that the Court didn't address 
heterosexua1's rights to engage in sodomy which could help to define the status of 
homosexuals in regards to judicial protection, and the second fact is "although an equal 
protection claim is implicit in the fact that the Hardwick statute was enforced only against 
homosexuals, the Court provided no holding on the equal protection issue (788), perhaps 
wisely so! Be that as it may, under careful examination, these two points, which are 
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understandably important to future cases, pose an interpretive problem for the lower 
courts. Rich articulates that the "decision allows sexual orientation discrimination ... [yet] 
some courts ... have noted that Hardwick never addresses an equal protection issue, and 
some have suggested that homosexuals are a suspect or a quasi-suspect class in spite of 
Hardwick" (788-789). Yet the majority of the courts regard this case as a "sweeping 
pronouncement against homosexuals" (789). 
G. Impact of the ruling on Public Policy 
By reading this work, one might assume that this case is a detrimental blow to the 
rights of homosexuals only. It is true that the decision of the Supreme Court in this case 
serves as powerful ammunition to deprive the rights of this already weak minority. For 
example, "the Court's decision and the Chief Justice's concurrence are thus an utter 
rejection of the homosexual lifestyle. Moreover, such characterizations of homosexuals 
can only serve to invite or reinforce the existing discriminatory treatment and 
stigmatization of homosexuals" (Cohen 220). Such treatment of homosexuals could 
possibly fuel the fire of discriminatory legislation against the group. But also leaves the 
state and lower district courts free to fashion their own interpretations on the equal 
protection issue. However, Khan asserts: 
" ... even though sodomy statutes are not generally enforced, the Court's ruling legitimizes moral 
condemnation of homosexuality. This moral condemnation will surely intensify discrimination 
that already exists against homosexuals in matters of housing and jobs. Indeed it will be ironic if 
the Hardwick rule generates a new wave of discrimination against homosexuals while the sodomy 
statutes remain unenforced (964). 
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But the professionals articulate that this decision may mark a "new trend in privacy rights 
cases" towards a traditional restrictive view (Vlahos 193), a view that could have 
sweeping consequences for everyone. 
v. Sodomy is not a fundantental right-so what? 
So why did I subject you to Hardwick? The answer lies in part to the flow of its 
logic, or lack thereof. The majority opinion, on one level, reflects the stereotypes and 
unfound assertions that pervade American Society. Lamentably, those assertions were 
given the backing of the most esteemed court in the world. But more importantly, I used 
its as an illustrative tool to frame the discussion of the suspectness of homosexuals. 
Sodomy laws, like the one upheld in Georgia by the High Court, are an integral 
component in the discussion of suspect classification. While it can be argued that for 
certain legal purposes the status of being a homosexual and engaging in homosexual 
conduct, sodonlY, can be examined independently of one another, it does not dispose of 
the fact that the two are inexorably linked. But what's all the fuss about? Sodomy laws 
are hardly ever enforced. They can be viewed as relics of a bygone era, statutory fossils 
that have little direct impact on any citizen. The problem with sodomy laws, however, 
lies not in the willingness of authorities to enforce them. No, their real danger is the 
impact they have on other areas of public policy and American jurisprudence. For these 
reasons, sodomy laws aimed at prohibiting consensual adults to engage in private, non-
commercial same-sex activities are categorically wrong and can/do severely impede 
homosexuals from becoming a suspect class. 
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First of all, sodomy laws are the prime vehicles in which people establish that 
discrimination against gays is permissible. Many current activists assert that sodomy 
laws are the "bedrock of discrimination against gays" (Mohr 53). The effect of sodomy 
laws on the populace is a nlental one. In effect they help to perpetuate unequal treatnlent 
of homosexuals. Mohr states this quite well when he says, " ... how after all can one 
legitimately force people to hire and rent to unapprehended felons" (53). In fact, what 
sodomy laws do is to help justify what would otherwise be an unsound argument for 
discrimination against gays and lesbians. Their mere existence, however superficially 
innocuous, ttsimply gives those opposed to civil rights something to say that does not 
sound patently prejudicial in an area where there may not be a lot to say" (53). Sodomy 
laws are in essence symbolic, a form of governmental propaganda which legitimizes and 
encourages disparate treatnlent of Americans based solely on their sexual orientation. 
The unfortunate consequences of sodomy laws and the charged societal 
atmosphere surrounding them do not end, however, with the general populace; they have 
infiltrated the very system that minorities have historically turned to for equitable 
treatment, the judiciary. The Hardwick decision is, superficially, the most obvious and 
damning example. Yet, the "marble temple's" preeminence did not ensure that all lower 
Courts would fall in line, yet this will be discussed at the end of this work. This section 
is certainly not a uniform condemnation of the judicial system. Many state courts have 
abolished their sodomy laws by using a right to privacy argument, as federal safeguards 
for privacy rights are merely a benchmark for rights. States can increase but not decrease 
a person's rights. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court said: 
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"Both the Tennessee Constitution and this State's constitutional jurisprudence establish that the 
right to privacy provided to Tennesseans under our Constitution is in fact more extensive than the 
corresponding right to privacy provided by the Federal Constitution" (21 TAM 7-4, 614). 
Perhaps where the Federal judiciary and legislature have faltered, the states can make 
some much-needed progress. 
Yet even with the states making bold strides in respect to the rescinding of 
sodomy laws, "the existence of sodomy laws also significantly affects the way in which 
judges ... apply the law in general" (Mohr 55). For example, in the work Opinion of the 
Justices, one finds that "Hardwick has been cited as supporting the constitutionality of a 
New Hampshire law prohibiting homosexuals from adopting or fostering children" (qtd. 
in Wintemute 45). While this may not have the shock value for others that it does for me, 
I have another example that is more curious. I quote David Newton: 
"In one classic case ... a child was awarded custody to his father, who lived 'in basically a one-
room cabin with a toilet surrounded by a curtain [where] the child [slept] in a fold-up cot by a 
woodstove and play[ ed] in an area littered with Busch beer cans,' while the father occupied his 
time leering at 'girly magazines.' The mother, who had a steady job as a nurse and who had 
provided the child with his own room in her home, was regarded as an unfit parent because she 
was a lesbian" (18). 
In addition, homosexuality can be used to effectively show poor moral character. But it 
has also been seen that gays or lesbians can be fired for circumstances that are entirely 
beyond their control. For example, "workers' reactions to a homosexual coworker might 
be sufficient grounds for dismissing a homosexual (Rich 780). All of the previously cited 
examples are only a sampling of the injustices that homosexuals face from the courts. 
For an example that deals more with the theme of this work, one must only look 
to the case of Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A judge cited Hardwick 
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and asserted that "if homosexual sodomy is not a fundamental right, then homosexuals 
cannot be a suspect or a quasi-suspect class" (qtd. in Rich 789). This statement illustrates 
that a narrow reading of the Hardwick decision can prostrate efforts to obtain judicial 
protection for homosexuals. 
In addition to the sodomy issue, which is interpreted by many judges to govern 
suspectness, other issues are affected by the instant situation. Indeed, one can say that 
this section has thus far dealt mainly with legal abstractions, such as strict scrutiny and 
suspect classification. What tangible, everyday inequities really arise from the 
fundamental rights issue? Unfortunately, the legal, political, and societal situations of 
homosexuals are deplorable. Some of the institutions that Americans hold most dear can 
be legally taken from homosexuals for the singular reason of the direction of their sexual 
attraction and sexual-identification. Homosexuals can be legally denied the following in 
many states and municipalities: housing opportunities, employment, intimate relations, 
child custody, common law marriage, tax exemptions, hospital visitation rights, 
inheritance from a deceased partner, equitable judicial access, etc. This staggering list is 
meant to be illustrative only, for it is by no means exhaustive. 
In my opinion, such unjust treatment, especially by the government, is by 
definition inherently "un-American" (quite unlike Congressman McCarthy's take on the 
word). Ifit is really as odd as it seems on paper, we must then analyze how the 
government, specifically the court system, actually attempts to justify the inequitable 
treatment of gays and lesbians. 
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VI. Rational Basis-or rationally moral? 
One way that discrimination is perpetrated against gays is the manner in which 
the courts analyze it. First of all, states assert that their police power is sufficient to allow 
anti-sodomy laws and in essence, homosexual discrimination policies. The States are 
granted the power "to legislate to protect public health, safety, welfare, and morality" 
(Stephens and Scheb D-19). States have asserted time and time again that prohibiting 
sodomy is based on both morality and public health concerns. We shall dispose of the 
morality argument first. It is easy to see that the majority opinion is infused with a 
religious/moral basis. Sonle would assert that the majority crossed the line with such 
obvious religious rhetoric. Laws can, however, have a religious element. It is common 
knowledge that America was first settled for the primary purpose of religious freedom. 
One only has to look to such colonies as Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Massachusetts to 
see that religion was a key component in lives of nlany colonial Anlericans. While we no 
longer live in a society where religion is co-equal power with the government, laws can 
still reflect morals, to a point. For example, just because there is a prohibition against 
murder in the Ten Commandments clearly does not mean a law against murder is a 
breach of the separation of church and state. 
But to what extent does this example still qualify as being valid? The answer to 
such a broad question requires a sufficient narrowing of the concept. First of all, we have 
to divide morally based laws into two categories, those directed at preventing harm to 
other people (like murder, theft, etc.) and those that are victimless (like anti-
miscegenation laws and sodomy laws). Next we will eliminate the first group of laws 
fronl the argument because the government has a prima facie reason to uphold this type 
Beach 28 
of legislation, whether it is based on religion or not. "For instance drugs and weapons are 
inherently dangerous ... and for property to be 'stolen,' someone must have been 
wrongfully deprived of it" (478 U.S. at 209). However, the other group of victimless 
offenses is by its nature different. In Hardwick, Justice Blackmun says that there is 
absolutely no record showing "the activity forbidden [ sodomy] to be physically 
dangerous, either to the persons engaged in it or to others" (209). Preventing people from 
inflicting harm on others is key to having a civilized society; it is difficult to assert 
though, that anti-miscegenation and sodomy laws play the same role. 
Working with the remaining category of victilnless crimes, we need to ask: can 
the moral beliefs and customs of a majority of electorates justify such a law? More 
directly, can it provide a rational basis for adjudication in the American judicial system? 
The court has said on numerous occasions that it cannot, but has done so most 
emphatically in Virginia's landn1ark anti-miscegenation case, Loving v. Virginia. "The 
invocation of 'morality' in support of Virginia's prohibition of mixed-race marriage in 
Loving was implicitly rejected" (Wintemute 45). With the precedent established that 
morality cannot be the sale basis for legislation, one must necessarily look for other 
qualifications. In this vein, Justice Blackmun maintained that "[t]he legitimacy of secular 
legislation depends ... on whether the State can advance some justification for its law 
beyond [emphasis added] its conformity to religious doctrine" (qtd. in 45). 
Sodomy laws that forbid this form of intimacy occurring between two adults that 
is private, consensual, and non-commercial in nature is legislation that cannot be based in 
custom and morality alone. For when it occurs between two adults---of opposite-sex or 
same-sex-and is consensual, non-commercial, and in private, then it is not inherently 
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harmful. When one applies the Hardwick case to the standards set forth in this section, 
one can ask whether the presumed belief of the majority of voters in Georgia, that 
homosexuality is wrong, can be a valid reason for making sodomy illegal? Moreover, 
can this be extended to fit a rational basis test? Obviously the court says that it can, but 
this reasoning does not square with the logic set forth in the Loving case. "Stripping 
away the religious beliefs supporting the electoral majority's disapproval, there remains 
nothing but a prejudice against persons engaging in the 'allegedly' immoral sexual 
activity, unless the majority could point to specific harmful consequences of the activity 
(none had been established in Hardwick)" (45). So there is a glaring logical gap between 
the Loving and Hardwick cases. 
Yet one could argue that there is a degree of severity that separates sodomy and 
miscegenation. I offer this "degree of severity" distinction merely as a straw argument 
because with more analysis it cannot be substantiated. Looking to the issue of abortion 
offers the necessary evidence to prove that a severity categorization cannot be rationally 
used to uphold certain types of moral legislation. Justice O'Connor took part in Planned 
Parenthood (a case about an attempt to restrict abortion) and Hardwick. She asserted in 
the former, "Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our basic principles of 
morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of 
all, not to mandate our own moral code" (qtd. in 46). This statement runs in the opposite 
direction of the Hardwick decision. While sodomy, viewed within its definition in this 
work, is not inherently harmful, abortion does harm an unborn fetus. I am taking no 
stand on the abortion issue in this paper because it is totally immaterial to my argument, 
but when examined within the constructs of this work, it does in fact have a greater 
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degree of severity than does sodomy. And this is the point of contention. If abortion is 
innately harmful and cannot be restricted because of morality, then how can sodomy be 
restricted on the same grounds? Thus, with the understanding of judicial precedent and 
non-inlportance of severity, a morality argument based on religion alone does not solidly 
withstand logical examination. 
We necessarily move to the States' public health arguments. The assertion that 
anti-sodomy laws are a matter of public health is perhaps the most compelling point in 
the rational basis test. For if state governments can argue this line of reasoning 
successfully, then moral rationalizations are entirely unnecessary. This section argues 
that while public health assertions may seem to be reasonable, they are indeed quite the 
opposite. To illustrate this point, we will reexamine the Tennessee case that invalidated 
the state's sodomy prohibition laws. In this case, (Campbell v. Sundquist, 21 TAM 7-4, 
1996), the state advances several state interests that "are allegedly advanced by the 
Homosexual Practices Act" (21 TAM 7-4, 614)." These interests are reflect the same 
hollow arguments used time after time by various other states and municipalities, so by 
examining Tennessee's examples, the police power argument can be dealt with on more 
of a national scope. 
The state said that the Act "discourages activities which cannot lead to 
procreation" (614). This argument totally flies in the face of a 1972 Supreme Court case, 
Eisenstadt v. Baird. In this case the court considered the constitutionality of a 
Massachusetts law prohibiting unmarried couples from using contraceptives. The Court 
found that "because that right of privacy is an individual right, laws forbidding the use of 
contraceptives by unmarried adults are likewise invalid" (Stephens and Scheb 682). So if 
unmarried couples cannot be forbidden to engage in matters that do not involve 
procreation, then Tennessee's attempt to discourage activities that do not lead to 
procreation doesn't square with the Supreme Court's precedent. 
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Next, the Act "discourages citizens from choosing a lifestyle which is socially 
stigmatized and leads to higher rates of suicide, depression, and drug and alcohol abuse. 
Aside from not citing any source for these allegations, this statement relies on the belief 
that homosexuality is a choice, a mere preference that can be changed, like a hair color or 
outfit. This argument is rather cyclical in nature because it is laws such as the 
Honl0sexual Practices Act that invariably perpetuate the social stigmatization it tries to 
avoid. The state also asserts that the Act "discourages homosexual relationships which 
are 'short lived,' shallow, and initiated for the purpose of sexual gratification" (614). The 
Puritans would be so proud! This argument is flawed because of its designation pointing 
only to homosexuals. Indeed, directing a law proscribing a particular group's presumed 
behavior is an instant flag for a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violation. States 
are required by the Constitution to provide "equal protection" (Amend, XIV, sec 1) to 
citizens and not to "abridge [their] privileges and immunities" (sec 1). 
The state's fourth point is its strongest. It states that the Act "prevents the spread 
of infectious disease" (21 TAM 7-4, 614). This can be seen as the most compelling point 
because something can be said for the prevention of disease, especially AIDS. But, it is 
general knowledge that AIDS is not a gay disease. The AIDS virus does not respect 
religion, race, gender, or sexual orientation. Quite simply, it kills heterosexuals in the 
same manner it kills gays, indiscriminately. Therefore, advancing an argument that the 
state is prohibiting the spread of AIDS by preventing homosexuals from having sex, 
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(even when gays are not the main cause of spreading the AIDS virus) is a regulation 
which is not "narrowly drawn." For instance, the state does not prohibit adults from 
smoking, although it obviously has deleterious effects on not only the smoker but also 
people who inhale second hand smoke. The state does not prohibit adults from 
consuming alcohol in general, but it has narrowly tailored laws to prohibit drinking while 
driving. A true balance between personal liberty and state interest was struck in this 
example. Thus, AIDS in and of itself cannot "provide additional justification for the 
withholding of civil liberties from them [homosexuals]" (Newton 28). Moreover, the 
aggregate effect of weak arguments, such as the ones presented above, does not make the 
general assertion of a police power argument any stronger. 
VII. Equal Protection adjudication-development 
Should homosexuals be elevated to a suspect class? This work will establish that 
they should indeed be viewed as a suspect class. First, however, we need to examine the 
history of this classification and then investigate the characteristics required to be a 
suspect class. It must be understood that the classification system about which this paper 
deals is grounded in the Equal Protection component of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Constitution mandates that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws" (Amend. XIV, sec. 1). Originally constructed to protect the 
rights of African-Americans during and after Reconstruction, the Equal Protection Clause 
is now considered to be a "broad shield against actions by state and local governments 
that would infringe on individual rights and liberties" (Stephens and Scheb 346). It has 
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gone through an impressive interpretive evolution, to become a safeguard for many civil 
liberties. 
The first time that it was used to create a classification system to aid in 
adjudication of civil liberties cases was in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
(1944). Lamentably, the Court upheld the relocation of Japanese-Americans to special 
containment camps during WWII. While this is considered to be a dark time in the 
history of the American judicial system, but "it marked the inception of the suspect 
classification system" (Stephens and Scheb 740). In the majority decision, Justice Hugo 
Black stated: 
" ... all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single group are immediately suspect. 
That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of 
such restrictions; racial antagonism never can" (qtd. in Stephens and Scheb 740). 
Justice Black's original statement has since been developed to encompass various levels 
of judicial analysis in situations where there is a law or policy that impinges on a right 
retained by the people. 
Today the Court recognizes three standards of review in civil rights and liberty 
cases: minimal scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. These standards 
correlate to different tests that determine exactly who is at fault. From the Hardwick 
case, one can remember that minimal scrutiny typically "involves the application of the 
rational basis test" (354). With this level of review, the burden of proof falls to the party 
bringing the suit. Thus, the courts begin "with a strong presumption that the challenged 
law or policy is valid" (354). The next level of review is that of heightened scrutiny, 
which is usually used in conjunction with "claims of gender-based discrimination" (354). 
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When moving from the lowest form of review to this one, the presumption of 
constitutionality-lithe doctrine ... holding that laws are presumed to be constitutional 
with the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff to demonstrate otherwise II (D-20}-is in 
effect reversed. Thus, the burden of proof falls to the government. 
The third and final tier of judicial review, the one with which this paper primarily 
deals, is that of strict scrutiny. Like heightened scrutiny, the presumption of 
constitutionality in this form of review is not in favor of the government. This is because 
this level of scrutiny pertains to those instances where there has been an overt breach of 
civil liberties and fundamental rights. "Included among those laws that are inherently 
suspect are those that classify persons based on race, religion, or ethnicity, as well as 
those that encroach upon fundamental rights" (740). As it stands, there is no uniform 
designation for homosexuals with regards to discrimination issues and fundamental rights 
breaches, although some courts vigorously use this classification. 
VIII. Suspect Classification-Applied 
Racial, ethnic, and religious minorities qualify as suspect classes, which fall under the 
purview of stlict scrutiny. Yet, to qualify as a suspect class, all of these groups had to 
meet certain criteria. I argue that homosexuals meet this criteria, and since gay rights 
have been denied by the Court using the right to privacy argument, a suspect 
classification argument is perhaps the best way to bring the rights of gay and lesbian 
citizens on par with those of heterosexual citizens. Wintemute believes: 
" ... the suspect classification argument is seen as capable of protecting both 
public and private same-sex emotional-sexual conduct, and potentially 
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encompassing all aspects of public sector discrimination against gay and 
lesbian ... persons, especially in employment, housing, and services, and with 
respect to the rights of couples and parents" (61). 
This assertion is why it is so important that homosexuals receive a suspect class 
designation. 
But, the qualifications for suspect classification must be examined. They are as 
follows: 
" ... (1) they [the group in question] have suffered a history of intentional unequal 
treatment; (2) the classification imposes on them a stigma that brands them as 
inferior; (3) they have been the object of widespread prejudice and hostility; (4) 
the unequal treatment they have suffered has often resulted from stereotyped 
assumptions about their abilities; (5) they constitute a 'discrete and insular' 
minority whose political participation has been seriously curtailed because of 
prejudice; (6) the basis of the classification is an immutable (and often highly 
visible) personal characteristic that each such individual possesses; [and] (7) the 
characteristic is irrelevant to their ability to perform in or contribute to society 
(and to any legitimate public purpose)" (62-63). 
First of all, it must be noted that in its various suspect classification decisions, the 
Supreme Court "has referred to different corrlbinations of these requirements, but has 
never provided a coherent theory explaining their purpose and relative importance" (63). 
So, it is not very easy to ascertain whether all of these are key to a suspect classification 
designation or whether a combination of just certain criteria is necessary. Thus," .. each 
writer seeking to apply them to a new classification is left to supply his or her own 
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framework" (63). This is exactly what I intend to do! I will deal with the first four 
criteria as a whole because they are generally held to be applicable to homosexuals and 
not difficult to prove. But the remaining three criteria are somewhat more problematic; 
thus, they will be dealt with individually. 
Again the first four requirements state that if a group is to be seen as suspect they 
must: have suffered maltreatment, have a social stigma which brands them as inferior, 
have been the object of pervasive prejudice, and finally have suffered as a result of 
stereotypes about their abilities. Careful inspection shows that every one of these four 
criteria apply to homosexuals. Many authors and judges also agree that" ... sexual 
orientation satisfies the first four criteria, because the history of international unequal 
treatment of, and the imposition of stigma on gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons as well 
as the prejudice and hostility against them, and stereotyped assumptions about them" 
(64). To say that homosexuals suffer maltreatment is a gross understatement. One only 
has to watch the nightly news to find evidence of such abuse--gays being beaten to death 
and left for dead, a man in Georgia stabbed and then burned to death-caused by only 
one thing, their sexual orientation. Indeed, the only motive that one needs to discriminate 
against gays is that the victim is a "faggot" or "dyke." In addition, some courts see 
homosexuality as a sufficient reason to terminate someone; homosexuality is ipso Jacto 
detrimental to job performance. The examples are shocking: a state supreme court 
accepted that a "man's sexual orientation, in and of itself, was evidence that he was unfit 
to teach" (Newton 10); a gay man was fired in Colorado "simply because he was gay, 
even [though he was] the best employee in the state" (2). This is clear evidence that 
applies the first four criteria to homosexuals. 
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While the first four requirements are easily met, the last three are more arguable. 
The fifth requirement basically states that gays lack political power. This criterion "is 
derived from ... Justice Stone: ' ... prejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may ... curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and ... call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry" 
(Wintemute 65). While many courts recognize gays as discrete and insular, the point of 
contention surrounds the "political power" aspect of the rule. The Supreme Court 
fluctuates on their reading of what constitutes political powerlessness. In some cases, the 
"slightest degree of success in achieving legislative protection disqualifies a minority 
from seeking constitutional protection through recognition of a suspect classification" 
(66). This would seem to be a detrimental blow to gay rights. 
But in the case of women (a quasi-suspect class) and African-Americans (a 
suspect class) several strides have been made in the advancement of their respective 
rights. Judge Spiegel of Ohio believes that "if this standard (existence of anti-
discrimination legislation and the other 'indicia of influence' cited above) were applied to 
women or racial minorities, neither would qualify as lacking political power and neither 
race nor sex would be suspect or quasi-suspect" (qtd. in Wintemute 66). Wintemute also 
asserts: 
"[the] difficulty they [homosexuals] face in forming political coalitions, the tenuousness of their 
political gains (repeal oflegal protection against discrimination has been sought in 38 or 125 
jurisdictions where it has been obtained in 34 cases), and their virtual absence from 'the Nation's 
decision making councils,'like women at the time of Frontiero [411 U.S. 677 (1973), the case that 
established that women's equal protection issues must be examined by a higher level of scrutiny 
than a rational basis test] (73 of 497,155 elected officials in the US were openly gay, lesbian or 
bisexual in June 1994)" (67). 
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But, societal opposition to gays is also an impediment to political power. Such 
organizations such as the Religious Right effectively utilized gays as a rallying point. 
The social forces at work in Amelican society have a serious impact on gay lights. Even 
the Supreme Court has recognized that "social, as opposed to legal, forces also might 
have the result for some groups of effectively excluding their participation in the political 
life of the nation ... " (Mohr169). The homophobic beliefs and actions of many 
Americans, evinced by hate crimes, gay-bashing, rigidly static religious rhetoric, and 
mass discrimination is certainly an obstruction to the advancement of gay rights. 
Finally, we can look at the judiciary itself as being an impediment to political 
power, due to the status/conduct doctrine that some courts follow. "Arguably, 
homosexuals have been deprived of political power, because activities designed to 
promote honl0sexual rights have been described by the courts as "flaunting" a 
homosexual lifestyle, which is adequate grounds for dismissal from ajob" (Rich 801). 
Thus, there seems to be something odd at work in the judiciary and in society that erects a 
barrier of sorts to gay rights. 
This is where the vicious cycle theory is most evident. I would argue that in 
addition to the impediments to gays' political power as mentioned above, the very nature 
of certain regulations, like those that forbid sodomy and allow discrimination, indirectly 
prevent political power and that must necessarily flow from individual empowerment. 
But most damning is the fact that homosexuals can be terminated from jobs and housing 
by only the perception of their homosexuality. 
For instance, suppose two men leaving a gay establishment were seen by a group 
of random thugs. Suppose that these thugs decided that it would be fun to "beat the shit 
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out of some faggots." Suppose that they did indeed do this heinous act, but were caught 
by two surprisingly vigilant police officers. Some people might applaud the efforts of 
these all-American boys, and some would certainly see it for the tragic crime that it is. 
Be that as it may, the wheels of justice will start to creek along at the police station where 
the victimized nlen will make their reports. The crucial point of this story comes when 
the men are asked if they would like to file charges, and they answer with an emphatic, 
"NO!" You, of course, might be left asking, "WHY?" 
During the course of a trial the men's homosexuality would certainly come to 
light. Such exposure can (and in reality does) give employers legal grounds to fire the 
victims of the gay bashing. The exposure of the men's sexual orientation gives any 
landlord the basis he/she needs for a legal eviction. Basically, by asserting their legal 
rights to prosecute these criminals, these gay men have to risk their jobs and homes, 
indeed, their very security. This is of course only illustrative, not to mention fiction, but 
it is grounded in fact. "Every day gays are in effect blackmailed by our judicial system" 
(Mohr 165). How can the constitutional mandates of equal protection under the law 
apply equally when the system responsible for ensuring this right is one of the main 
perpetrators of the problem? In sum, the lack of political power by gays is real. We 
experience roadblocks not only in the form of social opposition but also by the 
government and its various branches. 
The sixth criterion of a suspect classification is in a word "imnlutability." 
Although science points to homosexuality as something innate, it is not conclusive. And 
it must be said that some courts have found that homosexuality is "'immutable' for equal 
protection purposes [nleaning] 'effectively inlmutable' (change 'would involve great 
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difficulty'). Thus, sexual orientation is immutable because 'we have little control over our 
sexual orientation and ... , once acquired, [it] is largely impervious to change' ('through 
extensive therapy, neurosurgery or shock treatment') does not make it 'mutable'" (qtd. in 
Wintemute 67). The problem of immutability, though, is tough issue for other courts, 
because they fail to see the fine distinction between homosexual conduct and homosexual 
status-the main reason that I have dedicated a large portion of this work to sodomy 
laws. 
Indeed, the blurring of homosexual status and honlosexual conduct is the primary 
source of confusion for the courts. For example, in the case of High Tech Gays v. 
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 457 U.S. 216 (1982), the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that "[h]omosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is 
behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from race, gender, or alienage because 
'the behavior or conduct of. .. already recognized [suspect] classes is irrelevant to their 
classification" (qtd. in Wintemute 68). Yet, to play the oppositions argument in this case, 
we must look at the other behavioral aspects of other suspect and quasi-suspect classes. 
Judge Canby counters the majority in the High Tech Gays case by asserting "[0 ]ne can 
make 'behavioral' classes out of persons who go to church on Saturday, persons speaking 
Spanish, or persons who walk with crutches. The question is what causes the behavior?" 
(qtd in Wintemute 68). The judge poses a good question. 
I am neither a scientist, nor an expert legal scholar by any stretch of the word. 
However, I do have first-hand experience of being a gay American. I must admit that in 
my experience of interacting in the gay communities of various cities, I have not met one 
person who chose to be gay, lesbian, or bisexual. I can recall no person who "chose" to 
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be thrown out of their house because their parents were ashamed of them. I know of no 
one who willingly "chose" to be part of one of the most widely despised and hated groups 
in this country. And I have never met a homosexual that "chose" to be ostracized in 
school, or one that "chose" to live a life that could possibly risk job security. I am not 
saying that there are no people out there who have not chosen to have a same-sex 
experience, and as a white male, I can no more be the spokesperson for a such a 
multifaceted group such as homosexual-Americans than any other person. For it is true 
that homosexuality is quite possibly the most encompassing minority in the world, 
including veritably every cross-section of the world's popUlation. But it seems to run 
afoul to every logical tenet that I have ever encountered to say that someone would risk 
so much if they could simply change the despised characteristic, their same-sex 
orientation, thus making all of their problems disappear. 
The seventh and final criterion for suspect classification is that of irrelevance. 
This issue is divisive not because people really feel that being gay, lesbian, or bisexual 
can in most cases not have anything to do with job performance. Instead, it has to do 
with the status versus conduct issue. Wintemute states: 
"Those courts that have accepted the distinction between emotional-sexual attraction and 
emotional-sexual conduct have had no trouble in concluding that sexual orientation (as a direction 
of attraction) is rarely if ever, relevant to legitimate government purposes. Several judges have 
agreed that '[s]exual orientation plainly has no relevance to a person's "ability to perform and 
contribute to society"'(sic)" (68). 
But as was stated earlier, the problem arises when one does not see the distinction 
between status and conduct. "The argument, if one accepts the attraction-conduct 
distinction, is that the attraction may be immutable but that the conduct to which it gives 
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rise is 'immoral' or illegal and therefore makes the attraction 'relevant.' (69). Thus, we 
find ourselves once again entangled with sodomy laws. Finding an answer to the 
irrelevance question lies first of all in common sense: does being homosexual really 
affect one's ability to perfonn at work? But it also brings us back to the 
interconnectedness that this work establishes between status v. conduct, sodomy laws, 
and a suspect classification designation. 
IX. And ifit Works? 
What would the possible social ramifications be if sodomy laws were repealed 
and homosexuals were elevated to a suspect class? Surely it would be the end of 
civilization as we know it. Society would devolve into a moral cesspool with hardly a 
chance of recovery or salvation. Fire and brimstone would rain upon the earth in fierce 
waves of destruction. This is of course sarcasm. Yet some would assert that history 
illustrates what happens when homosexuality is not kept in check by the government. 
Professor Richard Mohr addresses this subject: 
"Recommendations to change social policy with regard to gays are invariably met with claims that 
to do so would invite the destruction of civilization itself: after all isn't that what did Rome in? 
Actually Rome's decay paralleled not the flourishing of homosexuality but its repression under the 
later Christianized emperors" (42). 
While an interesting point is made, the question concerning the fate of society still 
lingers. Yet, the question has already been answered in part. Indeed, "one need not now 
speculate about what changes refonns of gay social policy might bring to society at large. 
For many refornls have already been tried out here and there, and nothing weird has 
resulted from them" (43). In fact, the results from empirical studies where sodomy laws 
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have been stricken from the law books have shown that "there is no increase in any other 
crimes in [these] states that have decriminalized gay sex (43). Surely, rescinding sodomy 
laws is not starting down a road of which leads straight to hell. 
It is interesting to look at the dynamics of American society over the past 200 
years-and also to the Constitution-in regards to social policy and civil rights. While it 
was once widely held that African-Americans were mere property, women had no place 
in a voting booth, and people of different races shouldn't marry, America has shown a 
remarkable flexibility in adapting culture to keep up with the times and to eradicating 
static social beliefs that operate out of blind custom. America is truly a nation with a 
history of progressive reform. This is mirrored by our Constitution. The Framers, aware 
that this document would have to endure for ages, fashioned it with a built-in flexibility 
that permits it to deal with tribulations and changes of the country. 
As cited above, various states and municipalities have tested how gay rights 
would affect the nation. Again Richard Mohr states what I feel about the effects of gay 
rights on society rather well: 
"Society currently makes gay coupling very difficult: a life of hiding is a tense and pressured 
existence not easily shared with another. And society seems to find gay love even more 
threatening than gay sex. The latter society might excuse as an aberrant compulsion but the 
former is surely a matter of choice that shows a commitment and indicates that a homosexual does 
not view her or his condition as some sort of permanent flaw. In tum, this choice shows that more 
usual couplings are not a matter of destiny but of personal responsibility. And that society finds 
scary: that so-called basic unit of society-the family-turns out not to be a unique immutable 
atom, but can adopt different parts, be adapted to different needs, and even improved. Gays might 
even have a thing or two to teach others about divisions oflabor, the relation of sensuality to 
intimacy, and the stages of development in love relations" (44). 
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While the quote is lengthy, it is appropriate. Society does not suffer when it gives 
citizens the opportunity to live responsible lives. If a legitimate state interest exists in 
banning sodomy in order to curtail short-lived relationships initiated solely for the 
purposes of sexual gratification, that sounds fine to me. Thus, one could imply that the 
opposite, a long-term, monogamous relationship forged out of love and mutual-respect, 
would be encouraged. Yet, this is not the case! Gays are prohibited to have legally 
recognized donlestic partners; thus, an avenue for personal and societal responsibility is 
effectively killed. 
x. Conclusion-Bringing it all together 
In this work I have endeavored to show the interconnectedness between sodomy 
law and status versus conduct arguments. While separating homosexual status from 
homosexual conduct seems like an ingenious way to advance the gay rights struggle, it is 
in fact a detrimental barrier. By removing the sexual component of homosexuals, or 
heterosexuals for that nlatter, an integral human part of a person is severed. By saying 
that it is usually okay to be gay, but it is never okay to have sex is ludicrous; it is a mixed 
message and a state sanctioned form of celibacy advocacy. Religious fundamentalist and 
conservative scholars assert that homosexual status is defined by homosexual conduct. 
While their view of the relationship between the two is too rigid, they are correct to a 
point. Same-sex orientation and a physical expression of that attraction in a non-
commercial, private manner between consenting adults is invariably linked to 
homosexual status. Homosexual sex does not beget homosexual identification though; it 
merely affirms it. 
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By making such an innately private act the object of criminal legislation gives 
oppressors all the fuel they need to discriminate. Sodomy laws are the only semi-logical 
legal barriers that permit people to perpetuate disparate treatment against gays. Religion 
has always been an important part of America, but the religious arguments against 
homosexuals do not withstand analysis because they are grounded in nothing more than 
fear, misinterpretation, and hollow custom. Alleged legitimate state interests to permit 
anti-sodomy laws have been found time and time again to be either uncompelling or not 
narrowly drawn enough to advance that interest. 
Gays suffer discrimination, hate crimes, abuse, and various other affronts to their 
dignity on a daily basis. Even more staggering is the realization that state and local 
sanctions that label them as immoral, unapprehended felons back this disparate treatment. 
Such discrimination and unjust treatment in American society is indefensible. But when 
the hard evidence is examined, all of the pieces seemingly fall into place. Indeed, the 
argument to ban anti-sodomy laws and to elevate gays to a suspect class seems to look 
great on paper. They are in theory strong arguments. So, what gives? Why has the 
theory not been turned into a reality? 
While the Hardwick decision is seen by some as a substantial blow to gay rights, I 
see it as more of an enlightened investment in the future. Be warned! This is solely my 
opinion as a student of constitutional law. No other scholarly opinion exists to back these 
assertions. But any student of constitutional law know that the Supreme Court is a wise 
judicial body that sees well into the future. It anticipates change as well as being a 
catalyst for it. There were too many loopholes in the case for it to be a sound analysis. 
Looking back to the analysis of the opinion, the Equal Protection issue and suspectness of 
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gays is absent. This is either due to the narrowness doctrine or to the wisdom of the 
Court. In leaving these questions unresolved, the Court has struck a chord of federalism. 
It is allowing the various states to decide on their own how gays will be treated under the 
law. For the Court comes closest to illegitimacy when its opinions deals with matters it 
cannot enforce. I believe it is testing the federal waters to see if the country can by its 
own development and flexibility redress the maltreatment of homosexuals. It is letting 
the states and their various municipalities pave the way for gay rights. In effect, a 
momentum is being built by the judicial bodies and by individuals around the country to 
bring the rights of gay Americans on par with those of other citizens. At least I hope that 
this assertion is correct. In an age where, the government says that my loving another 
man is a crime, hope is of no small significance. In the near future, I trust that America 
will accept its responsibility to all of its citizens to ensure equality and fairness, despite 
their sexual orientation. 
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